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CIVIL ACTIONS-VOIR DIRE-INSURANCE-EFFECT OF INSURANCE COM-
PANY ADVERTISING-The Supreme Court of Montana has held that an
attorney may ask prospective jurors on voir dire if they have been
exposed to insurance company advertisements that correlate high jury
verdicts in personal injury cases with increased premiums for all
insured.
Borkoski v. Yost, 594 P.2d 688 (Mont. 1979).
On June 17, 1975, Jerome Borkoski filed a medical malpractice and
wrongful death action in a Montana trial court following the death of
his wife in an automobile accident.' The defendants in the action were
Doctors Robert Yost and James Gouax, the physicians who treated the
decedent in St. Patrick's Hospital after the accident.' During the
discovery stage of the action, the plaintiff learned that the defendants
carried malpractice insurance with companies that had been actively
involved in a national advertising campaign criticizing the amount of
jury awards in personal injury actions. The thrust of the adver-
tisements, which appeared in magazines of national circulation, 3 was
that large jury awards resulted in higher insurance premiums for
everyone.' One advertisement sponsored by the defendant Gouax'
insurance carrier described several cases which it considered to be
illustrative of windfall jury awards.5
On the first day of the trial, Borkoski presented a motion requesting
permission to conduct voir dire examination of prospective jurors to
1. Borkoski v. Yost, 594 P.2d 688, 689 (Mont. 1979).
2. Id. St. Patrick's Hospital was also an original defendant in the action. Prior to
trial, Borkoski settled with the hospital for $90,000. Id.
3. The advertisements appeared in periodicals such as Newsweek Reader's Digest,
Sports Illustrated and Time. Id at 689-90.
4. Id. at 689. An example of these advertisements depicted a judge holding a pur-
ported jury instruction which stated: "When awarding damages in liability cases, the jury
is cautioned to be fair and to bear in mind that money does not grow on trees. It must be
paid through insurance premiums from uninvolved parties, such as yourselves." Beneath
this picture in large type was the statement: "Too bad judges can't read this to a jury."
The advertisement described several cases which the sponsoring insurance company con-
sidered illustrative of "windfall" jury awards. The two-page advertisement then listed
several suggestions to rectify the purported problem, concluding:
We can ask juries to take into account a victim's own responsibility for his losses.
And we can urge that awards realistically reflect the actual loss suffered-that
they be a fair compensation, but not a reward. Insurers, lawyers, judges - each of
us shares some blame for this mess. But it is you, the public, who can best begin to
clean it up. Don't underestimate your own influence. Use it as we are trying to use
ours.
Id.
5. Id. at 689. See note 4 supra.
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determine whether they had been exposed to and influenced by the
advertising campaign.' The trial judge denied Borkoski's motion, but
did permit the plaintiff to inquire whether each juror felt that doctors
or professional people were unnecessarily oppressed by lawsuits or
large verdicts. Borkoski also asked if the prospective jurors had read
any articles or advertisements about this type of case which would
affect their decision in the litigation.
7
After a seven-day trial, the jurors deliberated for approximately
forty minutes and returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.
Borkoski moved for a new trial, contending that he was denied a fair
and impartial jury because of the refusal of his voir dire motion8 by
the trial court. The Supreme Court of Montana granted Borkoski's ap-
peal and decided that upon a proper showing of prejudice, an attorney
may ask if a prospective juror has read anything that would indicate
that verdicts for plaintiffs in personal injury cases result in higher
insurance premiums for everyone? However, the court noted that the
questioned advertisements were only intended to reduce the amount of
jury awards. Because the jury in this case had absolved the defendant
of negligence completely, the Montana high court affirmed the judg-
ment of the district court."0
Justice Daly, speaking for the unanimous Supreme Court of Mon-
tana, noted that the Borkoski appeal brought to the court's attention
an issue of increasing concern to both lawyers and laypersons."
Because the advertising campaign of leading insurance companies
raised the possibility of serious prejudice to personal injury plaintiffs,"
the court stated that it was necessary to reexamine the propriety of
precluding mention of insurance by attorneys on voir dire. 3 The court
agreed with the appellant that the purpose of voir dire was to enable
counsel to determine the existence of prejudice on the part of jurors
and to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges. Justice Daly also
stated that the trial judge could set reasonable limits on the scope of
examination, with due regard for fairness to both parties.
6. Id. at 689-90.
7. Id. at 690. The exact questions asked on voir dire were unavailable in the appel-
late court due to the lack of a transcript below. Id.
8. Id. The appellant also contended that the verdict was not supported by the
evidence. Id.
9. Id. at 695.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 690.
12. Id. As evidence of the possibility of prejudice, the court cited a psychological
study which concluded that "even a single exposure to one of these ads can dramatically
lower the amount of award a juror is willing to give." See Loftus, Insurance Advertising
and Jury Awards, 65 A.B.A.J. 68, 69 (1979).
13. 594 P.2d at 690.
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The Borkoski court noted that the Montana rule allowing voir dire
on the analogous issue of the financial interest of prospective jurors in
insurance companies' was the position of the majority of jurisdictions
that had considered the issue. 5 The court recognized, however, that
the authorities were divided on the question presented in Borkoski.
Justice Daly first noted that in at least six jurisdictions, such an
inquiry was prejudicial and constituted reversible error."0 At the other
extreme, the court'noted that the Arkansas Supreme Court recently
decided in King v. Westlake" that counsel could ask on voir dire
whether prospective jurors had seen the advertisements correlating
high jury verdicts with rising insurance premiums; whether they
believed the advertisements; and whether this belief would preclude
them from rendering a fair and impartial verdict."8 In the absence of a
definitive majority rule, Justice Daly examined the compelling cir-
cumstances surrounding Borkoski's motion to examine jurors concern-
ing the insurance advertisements. He noted that there was evidence of
institutional advertising by the insurance companies involved in the
case and that the advertisements had been carried in popular
magazines at about the time of drawing the jury panel. He further
recognized that the advertising was primarily calculated to bias jurors
against awarding large amounts of damages to personal injury plain-
14. See Haynes v. County of Missoula, 163 Mont. 270, 517 P.2d 370 (1973).
15. 594 P.2d at 692.
16. Id at 692-93. Some courts have ruled that questioning to determine prejudice
based on belief that high verdicts affect individual premium rates is in the discretion of
the trial judge. See Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965); Murrell v.
Spillman, 442 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1969); Butcher v. Main, 426 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. 1968). Other
courts have concluded that an inquiry into the juror's belief that verdicts affect insurance
rates conveyed the impression that the defendant carried insurance and constituted rever-
sible error. See Barton v. Owen, 71 Cal. App. 3d 484, 139 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1977); Maness v.
Bullins, 19 N.C. App. 383, 198 S.E.2d 752 (1973); Brockett v. Tice, 445 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1969).
17. 572 S.W.2d 841 (Ark. 1978). The controversial voir dire questioning in King
involved the same advertisements at issue in Borkoski. 594 P.2d at 693.
18. 594 P.2d at 693. The Borkoski court also noted that other jurisdictions had gone
further than allowing voir dire as a means to combat the injurious effect of insurance
advertising. The court noted, for example, that in Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 96
Misc. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1978), the New York Supreme Court, Queens
County, had held that an insurance company could be enjoined from publishing adver-
tisements of the sort at issue in Borkoski on the grounds that the advertisements con-
stituted jury tampering and denied a plaintiff the right to a fair and impartial jury. 594
P.2d at 693. In Kansas and Connecticut, some insurance companies have entered into con-
sent agreements with the Commissioners of Insurance in which the companies have
agreed to stop publishing the advertisements in those states. See Hatchell, Kronzer, and
Scott, Insurance Company Advertising: New Problems in Voir Dire? 10 ST. MARY'S L.J.
393, 439 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Insurance Company Advertising].
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tiffs such as Borkoski."9 Given this background, the court concluded
that a line of inquiry designed to uncover jury bias created by the
advertisements should be permitted. The court pointed out that liberal
voir dire was the best means of securing a plaintiff's right to an impar-
tial jury when insurance companies inject the issue of insurance into
the consciousness of every potential juror."0
Thus, the court held that upon a showing of possible prejudice, an
attorney may ask if a prospective juror has heard or read anything to
indicate that jury verdicts for plaintiffs in personal injury cases result
in higher premiums for everyone. If a juror responds affirmatively, the
Borkoski court ruled that the attorney may inquire whether the juror
believed those materials and whether this belief would interfere with
the juror's ability to render a fair and impartial verdict. The Montana
court stated that limited follow-up questions should be permitted,
depending upon the veniremen's responses and subject to the trial
court's discretion.2' In an attempt to balance the rights of the defen-
dant to a fair and impartial jury, the Borkoski court also held that cer-
tain general questions should precede specific questions about the
advertisements. As an example, the court stated that an attorney
should ask if the prospective juror has heard of or read anything which
might affect his ability to be impartial, or whether the prospective
juror regularly reads any of the magazines or newspapers in which the
insurance advertisements or articles appeared. Justice Daly noted that
a negative response to the introductory questions would obviate fur-
ther inquiry. He emphasized that voir dire should be permitted only
after counsel has shown that he is acting in good faith in interjecting
insurance into the case.'
Although the court accepted Borkoski's argument that voir dire on
the effect of insurance company advertising should be allowed in the
proper situation, the court concluded that the purpose of the adver-
tisements was to reduce the amount of damages awarded by a jury,
not to prevent a jury from finding a party negligent in the first place.23
Because the Borkoski jury never reached the question of damages, the
19. 594 P.2d at 694. See note 12 supra.
20. 594 P.2d at 694.
21. Id. The court declined to comment on the permissible nature or extent of the
follow-up questions, but did conclude that circulation among the jury panel of the insur-
ance advertisements, as Borkoski had planned, would be improper and would create the
very prejudice being guarded against. Id
22. Id. at 695. The court suggested that the trial judge should be advised, in the
absence of the jury, of the proposed questions and their purpose in order to determine the
plaintiffs good faith. Id See Canter v. Lowrey, 69 N.M. 81, 364 P.2d 141 (1961).
23. 594 P.2d at 695.
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court held that any error committed was harmless and not grounds for
reversal.2"
The media campaign of the late 1970's by insurance companies,
aimed at what the industry considers excessive jury awards, has
created a conflict between the rule of nondisclosure of insurance dur-
ing a trial25 and the policy of liber voir dire to determine the prej-
udices of prospective jurors." The rule of nondisclosure developed due
to the fear that juries would award extravagant verdicts if the exis-
tence of insurance were made known to them." The judicial rationale
was that if a jury knew that a defendant did not have to pay the judg-
ment personally, large verdicts would be awarded regardless of liabil-
ity. 8 Furthermore, since insurance has no bearing on the negligence of
a defendant, it has been considered an irrelevant issue.' There are,
however, four recognized situations when insurance may be interjected
during a trial. If insurance is relevant to an issue such as agency,
ownership, or control of a vehicle or instrumentalility, its disclosure
has been allowed.' Second, when the credibility of a witness is suspect
due to his employment by an insurance company, that fact can be used
to show his bias."1 The courts have also recognized that when insurance
coverage can not be severed from the admission of a party without
lessening the evidentiary value of the admission, disclosure is war-
ranted. 2 Finally, when a witness makes an unexpected or unresponsive
reference to insurance, reversal is not mandated.'
24. Id.
25. J. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 201 (1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK].
26. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Insurance Company Advertising,
supra note 18, at 395. The insurance industry engaged in a similar, although less effective,
campaign during the 1950's in an attempt to reach and affect potential jurors. Id at 399.
27. See, e.g., Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 1965); Wilson v.
Thurston, 82 Mont. 492, 267 P. 801 (1928); Kuntz v. Spence, 67 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex. 1934).
28. See, e.g., Muehlebach v. Mercer Mortuary and Chapel, Inc., 93 Ariz. 60, 378 P.2d
741 (1963).
29. See Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 5 KAN. L. REV. 675, 710-18 (1957).
30. See, e.g., Pinckard v. Dunnavant, 281 Ala. 533, 206 So.2d 340 (1968) (landlord's
liability insurance for third persons on premises admissible); Carlton v. Johns, 194 So.2d
670 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (defendant's liability insurance could be introduced at trial to
establish ownership of automobile involved in accident); Cherry v. Stockton, 75 N.M. 488,
406 P.2d 358 (1965) (evidence that employer pays liability insurance on employee is ad-
missible to prove master-servant relationship).
31. See O'Donnell v. Bachelor, 429 Pa. 498, 240 A.2d 484 (1968) (evidence that witness
was employed by defendant's company admissible to permit jury to determine if employ-
ment relationship predisposed witness toward defendant).
32. See Meda Constr. Co. v. Jenkins, 137 Ga. App. 344, 223 S.E.2d 732 (1976)
(evidence of admission by independent contractor's construction foreman that insurance
would take care of cracked wall was not prejudicial error).
33. See Rigelman v. Gilligan, 265 Or. 109, 506 P.2d 710 (1973) (evidence of insurance
admitted by witness permitted).
1980
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In addition to these exceptional situations involving the presentation
of evidence, twenty-one jurisdictions- have ruled that counsel may in
good faith question jurors on voir dire concerning their financial inter-
est in insurance companies." The courts which allow the voir dire
inquiry have attempted to balance the judicial aversion to allowing the
interjection of insurance coverage into the minds of jurors against the
policy of American voir dire, which is traditionally extensive and prob-
ing."6 The purpose of jury screening is to determine whether there is
ground for a peremptory challenge to exclude a juror with inordinate
partialities. This assures litigants a jury that is capable of deciding the
case on the basis of the facts presented instead of on individual preju-
dices. 7 In light of these goals of voir dire, the Borkoski case empha-
sized that a reevaluation of the general rule prohibiting discussion of
insurance coverage was needed. Because jurors may now bring a bias
for insurance companies into the courtroom,3' courts are faced with situa-
tions in which the existence of insurance should be candidly discussea
with jurors on voir dire."
34. See Vredenburgh Saw Mill Co. v. Black, 251 Ala. 302, 37 So.2d 212 (1948);
Kotzebue v. Ipalook, 462 P.2d 75 (Alaska 1969); Tantum v. Rester, 241 Ark. 1059, 412
S.W.2d 293 (1967); Tomblinson v. Nobile, 103 Cal. App. 2d 266, 229 P.2d 97 (1951); Mayer
v. Sampson, 157 Colo. 278, 402 P.2d 185 (1965); Sutton v. Gomez, 234 So. 2d 725 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1970); Holland v. Watson, 118 Ga. App. 468, 164 S.E.2d 343 (1968); Carr v. Kin-
ney, 41 Hawaii 166 (1955); Seyferlich v. Maxwell, 28 Ill. App. 2d 469, 171 N.E.2d 806
(1961); Gamble v. Lewis, 227 Ind. 455, 85 N.E.2d 629 (1949); Nathena v. Burchett, 189 Kan.
350, 369 P.2d 487 (1962); Insko v. Cummins, 423 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1968); Fosness v.
Panagos, 376 Mich. 485, 138 N.W.2d 380 (1965); Rom v. Calhoun, 227 Minn. 143, 34 N.W.2d
359 (1948); Hancock v. Light, 435 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968); Canter v. Lowrey, 69
N.M. 81, 364 P.2d 140 (1961); Sheridan v. Sheridan, 286 App. Div. 926, 142 N.Y.S.2d 819
(1955); Abbott v. Rudolph, 73 S.D. 628, 47 N.W.2d 563 (1951); Swift v. Wimberly, 51 Tenn.
App. 532, 370 S.W.2d 500 (1963); Kollmorgan v. Scott, 447 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969);
Filipiak v. Plombon, 15 Wis. 2d 484, 113 N.W.2d 365 (1962).
35. Although this is not an exception to the rule excluding evidence of insurance, it is
a situation which results in an intimation to jurors that the defendant is insured. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 25, § 201. Some jurisdictions also allow voir dire on whether the prospec-
tive jurors are policyholders in a particular company. See, e.g., Haston v. Gightower, 111
Ga. App. 87, 140 S.E.2d 525 (1965); Barrett v. Morris, 495 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
See also Borkoski v. Yost, 594 P.2d at 692.
36. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), the Court noted that probing questions
allow counsel to determine possible bias and thus to employ his peremptory challenges or
challenges for cause. Id. at 219.
37. Id. at 220.
38. See text accompanying notes 30-36 supra.
39. Apart from the voir dire area, courts have been reexamining the theory that the
mention of insurance prejudices a jury against a defendant. This trend is based on the
recognition that the modern juror now enters the courtroom with the preconception that
insurance exists. In addition, liability insurance is almost universally carried by
automobile owners, as is malpractice insurance by professionals. Given these realities,
courts have stated that it is naive to believe that jurors are not aware of the widespread
Vo1.18:761
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The continuing strength of the judicial policy against presentation of
the fact of insurance is evidenced by the rulings of the courts of Califor-
nia,"0 Texas,41 and North Carolina. 2 These jurisdictions maintain that
despite the prejudicial effect that the controversial advertisements
may have on prospective jurors, the interjection of insurance into the
case during the voir dire results in prejudice against the defendant.
The rationale for the adherence to the traditional rule is that
disclosure places an unnecessary emphasis upon the subject and
implants insurance in the jurors' minds. 3 It has also been said that
questioning veniremen about the advertisements will not disclose their
prejudices, since jurors are reluctant to admit a bias that would
preclude them from rendering an impartial verdict." Thus, voir dire
questions about possible bias are viewed in these jurisdictions as a
fruitless line of inquiry.
There are, however, some courts that have shown a willingness to
allow a broader voir dire on insurance questions in limited situations.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 5 Kentucky,"6
and Missouri 7 have held that the determination of what is permissible
voir dire is in the discretion of the trial courts, with the only limitation
being good faith." In other words, the proper purpose of inquiry is to
determine a juror's bias. It is not to be used to implant the defendant's
status as insured in a prospective juror's mind. 9 These courts,
however, have not sanctioned a line of inquiry concerning the in-
surance company advertisements.
use of insurance, and equally implausible to conclude that they do not assume that a
defendant is insured. See, e.g., Muehlebach v. Mercer Mortuary and Chapel, Inc., 93 Ariz.
60, 378 P.2d 741 (1963); Causey v. Cornelius, 164 Cal. App. 2d 269, 330 P.2d 468 (1958).
40. Barton v. Owen, 71 Cal. App. 3d 484, 139 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1977).
41. Brockett v. Tice, 445 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969).
42. Maness v. Bullins, 19 N.C. App. 386, 198 S.E.2d 752 (1973). But see Parris v.
Garner Commercial Disposal, 40 N.C. App. 282, 253 S.E.2d 29 (1979), in which the court
indicated its interest in protecting a resident plaintiff's right to have a jury reach its ver-
dict free of outside influence. Although the court was concerned mainly with asserting
jurisdiction over an insurance company advertising in periodicals in the state, the court
suggested that it would uphold an injunction directing the insurance company not to place
the advertisements at issue in Borkoski. 253 S.E.2d at 35.
43. 594 P.2d at 694-95.
44. See Barton v. Owen, 71 Cal. App. 3d 484, 139 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1977).
45. See Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965).
46. See Murrell v. Spillman, 442 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1969).
47. See Butcher v. Main, 426 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. 1968).
48. Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965); Insko v. Cummins, 423 S.W.
2d 261 (Ky. 1968); Hancock v. Light, 435 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
49. See Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 5 KAN. L. REV. 675 (1957). See also Comment,
Voir Dire Examination of Jurors Concerning Insurance Company Interests, 15 DE PAUL
L. REV. 148 (1965); Comment, Defendant Rebuts Inference of Insurance, 5 STAN. L. REV.
143 (1952).
Duquesne Law Review
Borkoski v. Yost marked only the second time that a state court has
decided that upon a showing of good faith, counsel could ask prospec-
tive jurors if they believed that the size of jury verdicts in personal
injury cases affected insurance premiums.5 1 In King v. Westlake,"' the
Arkansas Supreme Court expanded its good faith doctrine' to encom-
pass questions about the insurance advertisements. The court rejected
the defendant's contention that the questioning served no value, and
resulted in implanting the existence of insurance in the jurors' minds.
The Arkansas court held that the questioning was proper because it
was conducted in good faith and enabled counsel to determine whether
there were grounds for a challenge for cause or a peremptory
challenge.
Although the advertising campaign of the insurance industry clearly
invites potential jurors to consider the insurance implications of their
verdicts,"3 the majority of courts have not disregarded their traditional
aversion to the mention of insurance coverage within the hearing of
the jury." Although the judicial posture on the issue is still unsettled,
the trend is to permit some mention of insurance on voir dire upon a
good faith showing that it is necessary, but not all courts which have
adopted the good faith rule have directly addressed the insurance
advertising controversy.5 Controlled questioning on the issue would
effectuate both the policy of protecting the defendant from prejudice"
while permitting probing voir dire to determine possible prejudice
against the plaintiff's interests. The Borkoski decision, with its require-
ment of preliminary questions to determine whether inquiry about the
advertisements is necessary in the first instance, is a balanced ap-
proach to a sensitive issue. Borkoski effectively counteracts the effects
of prejudicial insurance advertising. It is a more expedient and effec-
tive method of providing protection to plaintiffs than enjoining the
50. At least one jurisdiction has enjoined the insurance company advertisements. In
Quinn v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 96 Misc. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1978), the
court recognized that commercial speech is protected only if truthful. Id. at 554, 409
N.Y.S.2d at 477. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). When the adver-
tising is unfair and abusive, the state has the power to regulate the expression. The senti-
ment of the New York Supreme Court, Queens County, was that it had a duty to restrain
unfair and abusive advertising infringing upon the judicial process. 96 Misc. 2d at 554, 409
N.Y.S.2d at 477. See also note 42 supra. Connecticut and Kansas have accomplished the
same result by securing consent orders from insurance companies in which the industry
agreed not to publish the advertisements. See note 18 supra.
51. 572 S.W.2d 841 (Ark. 1978).
52. See note 34 supra.
53. See note 4 supra.
54. See text accompanying notes 27-29 & 43-44 supra.
55. See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
56. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
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publication of the advertisements. 7 Although enjoining the advertising
eliminates the possible prejudicial effect on those not yet exposed to
the advertisements, it cannot eliminate the effect on prospective jurors
who have already seen the advertisement." Thus, the Borkoski solu-
tion is the preferable one.
Anna E. Dolak
57. See Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct.
1978). In Quinn, the court traced the line of United States Supreme Court cases which
have held that commercial speech is protected under the first amendment from prior
restraint so long as it is not false or misleading. Id. at 551-55, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 476-78. The
court found that the advertisements in question are misleading because they imply that
personal injury awards are excessive and unwarranted by the facts but do not indicate
that such awards may be reduced or set aside. Id. at 555, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 478. See Geisel,
Horror Story Ads Untrue?-Can't Prove Mower, Claims Assertions, 11 Bus. INS. 1, 66
(1977).
58. See Loftus, Insurance Advertising and Jury Awards, 65 A.B.A.J. 68 (1979).

